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HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By R.J. Vincent. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 186. Cloth, 
$34.50; paper, $8.95. 
Few issues divide cynics from idealists as sharply as the role of 
human rights in foreign affairs. R.J. Vincent's1 book, Human Rights 
and International Relations, attempts to bring some order to this de-
bate by providing a history of rights thinking in Western and three 
selected non-W estem cultures, a survey of the current practice in 
human rights discussion, and finally, a proposal on the role human 
rights should play in the foreign policy of the developed nations. 
After a carefully argued and rather abstract discussion, Dr. Vin-
cent condudes that the most urgent human right in need of protection 
is the right to life, which he defines as the right to subsistence and 
security. This primary right also includes the liberty necessary to as-
sert. it. 2 However, this seemingly limited definition of human rights in 
international society imposes enormous correlative duties on the de-
veloped world, making the book more appealing as a work of political 
philosophy than as a prescription for policymakers. 
Dr. Vincent divides Human Rights and International Relations 
into three parts, entitled Theory, Practice, and Policy. The first part 
traces the development of ideas critical of the modem conception of 
human rights from ancient Greece to the present. It begins with an 
analysis of the Greek concept of nature, which provides a tool for con-
structing an ideal world based on rational principles, as contrasted 
with the everyday world. The Stoics, influenced by the cosmopolitan-
ism of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, 
broke open the enclosed community of the polis and upheld the individ-
ual as an independent moral agent. The master concept, making this 
development possible, was that of reason yoked to nature . 
. . . The individual belonged to a universal community which existed 
by nature and whose rules were apprehended by the use of reason. [p. 
21] 
Christianity reinforced these two concepts with its doctrines of indi-
vidual salvation and universalism. The Reformation, which began by 
legitimizing absolutist princes, no matter how unworthy, as divinely 
ordained, ended by recognizing a right of resistance derived from the 
1. R.J. Vincent is a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford. 
2. Liberty may also be a basic right ... in the sense that it is essential to the enjoyment of 
all other rights, including the right to life. . . . [H]aving a right to life means having at least 
the liberty to protest and mobilize opinion against its deprivation - having some access to 
institutions that guarantee it. Otherwise life is merely something for the provision of which 
one thanks the despot and hopes for the best. 
Pp. 125-26 (footnote omitted). 
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ruler's obligation to govern justly. In the process, the focus shifted 
from individual duties to rights, culminating in the French Revolu-
tion. This, in tum, led to criticisms from thinkers as diverse as Burke, 
Bentham, Hegel, and Marx. After discussing these criticisms, and 
works by contemporary philosophers, Dr. Vincent notes that "a 
strength of the theory of human rights [is] in its capacity to absorb 
criticism in a way that enriches the theory" (p. 36). The effect of the 
criticisms has been to create lists of economic and group rights, with 
much of the international political debate centering on competing ver-
sions of the rights thesis. 
Dr. Vincent concludes the first part with a discussion of cultural 
relativism, which he defines as the belief that rules of morality vary 
from place to place and that those rules can be derived from, and have 
validity only in, that cultural context. 3 His discussion has three sec-
tions. In the first portion, the author develops what he concedes is a 
crude picture of the differences among cultures in thinking about 
human rights by focusing on modem African, Chinese, and Islamic 
societies (p. 38). The African section is primarily an examination of 
the Banjul Charter on Human and People's Rights, which was passed 
in 1981 by the Organization of African Unity. This document refers 
both to individual and collective rights. Dr. Vincent concludes that 
the African statesmen have reversed the traditional Western hierarchy 
of rights (civil and political, economic and social, collective) by em-
phasizing the right of national self-determination, followed by the 
right to development, and then, finally, individual rights. Contempo-
rary Chinese thought, in tum, reflects the Marxist suspicion that indi-
vidual rights are a bourgeois doctrine used to thwart the goals of the 
proletariat. Thus, while human rights rhetoric may have served cer-
tain historically useful purposes (for example, in the French Revolu-
tion and in the struggle against fascism), it cannot be used to oppose 
the ultimate emancipation of man that will come with communism. 
Under this theory, human rights are regarded as the rights of groups 
to independence and development. Finally, in Islam human rights are 
connected with obligations owed to God. Unlike Christianity, Islam 
has never distinguished between the political and spiritual realms and 
therefore has never developed an independent set of political rights 
(pp. 43-44). 
In the second section of the discussion of cultural relativism, Dr. 
Vincent notes that the twentieth century has seen a gradual break-
down of the idea that the only subjects of public international law are 
states. In the process, he argues that states have a limited present obli-
gation not to violate human rights. Therefore, documents such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are more than simply non-
binding resolutions of the General Assembly; they may be authorita-
3. P. 37. Dr. Vincent refers to this as the strong version of cultural relativism. P. 54. 
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tive interpretations of the United Nations Charter or, perhaps, 
reflective of customary international law. Also the International 
Court of Justice in its Barcelona Traction 4 decision, referred to obliga-
tions erga omnes, obligations that all states owe to all other states and 
for whose breach any state may seek redress. The Court mentioned 
that one source of these obligations is "the principles and rules con-
cerning the basic rights of the human person" (p. 46; quoting Barce-
lona Traction). Dr. Vincent suggests that these obligations may have 
become jus cogens as well; that is, peremptory norms binding on all 
states and from which no derogation is permitted. 
Dr. Vincent concludes this section by reflecting on the "strong" 
version of cultural relativism. He argues that two erroneous implica-
tions flow from this strong version: that each culture has an equally 
valid pattern of life, and that moral claims from outside the culture 
have no validity within it. According to Dr. Vincent, the first conten-
tion is wrong because cultural relativism merely observes that values 
are endogenously derived; it cannot rank cultures as equal or unequal. 
The second contention is dismissed because it is "morally obnoxious" 
(pp. 54-55). The author comments that for a moral claim to be taken 
seriously, its claimants must want to persuade others of its validity (p. 
56). He notes that the three international political communities -
Western, Marxist, and Third World - all seek to persuade each other 
to accept their version of human rights, suggesting a universal moral 
community. Thus, the lesson from cultural relativism is not that a 
human rights debate is pointless, but that sensitivity to the cultural 
claims of the other participants is useful in reaching consensus. 
The second part, Practice, tries to show the shape of the current 
cross-cultural debate on human rights. In particular, Dr. Vincent 
builds upon the previous section by showing that even though many of 
the ideas underlying human rights are predominantly Western, "[t]he 
gradual accumulation of standards of right conduct, expressed in in-
ternational conventions ... becomes ... the measure of consensus in 
an evolving international society rather than the expression of the he-
gemony of one state or culture within it" (p. 108). Although the au-
thor looks at human rights discourse in both East-West and North-
South relations, he focuses on the latter. The South, in Dr. Vincent's 
opinion, 
asserts not merely the particular priority of the right of subsistence, but 
also a general priority to economic and social rights over civil and polit-
ical rights. In its most exaggerated form, it makes the exercise of all 
economic and social rights a prerequisite for the exercise of all other 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. [p. 78] 
However, the South has not been very successful in persuading the 
West of this hierarchy, causing it to seek compromises in international 
4. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3. 
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conferences and at the United Nations in order to obtain a limited 
legitimization of its priorities. 
The West has responded to these arguments with a doctrine of 
"basic human needs," in which economists provide a list of essential 
physical requirements such as food and water, while lawyers add to 
this a list of civil liberties on the theory that broad-based economic 
development cannot take place in a repressive environment (pp. 85-
86). This approach, according to Dr. Vincent, reflects the thinking of 
institutions such as the World Bank, and rejects Third World argu-
ments that it is the international system itself that beggars the South 
and that the cure is to protect the rights of nations. Dr. Vincent con-
cludes by accepting a modified version of the doctrine of basic needs. 
He questions sweeping statements about priority of rights, arguing in-
stead that rights are interdependent and that it is short-sighted to look 
at individual or group rights in isolation (p. 89). He sees group rights 
deriving from rights of individuals and criticizes the Southern doctrine 
to the extent that it ignores domestic oppression and focuses exclu-
sively on external exploitation. By contrast, "basic human needs" is 
an acknowledgment by the West that a prerequisite for assertion of 
other individual rights is the right to life, which involves a right to 
both subsistence and security. 
The final part of Human Rights and International Relations, Pol-
icy, is an attempt to apply the interdependence-of-rights thesis. It is 
here that Dr. Vincent has his greatest difficulty. In chapter 7, he com-
pares the "morality of states" model of international relations, which 
stresses the centrality of states as international moral agents, with the 
"cosmopolitanist morality" view, which regards individuals as part of 
a global community. Noninterventionism is the guiding principle 
under the former conception, whereas under the latter view an outrage 
in one part of the world is a matter of concern for all. The author 
endorses a modified morality of states: he accepts that global institu-
tions have not developed to the point where world politics can be effec-
tive without regard to states, although international law does permit 
certain limited interventions such as counter-intervention and assist-
ance to successful secessionist movements (p. 125). Humanitarian in-
tervention is limited to situations which "outrag[e] the conscience of 
mankind" (p. 125). Thus, while states can judge other states by their 
own conception of morality, they cannot impose that conception on 
others. Instead, he argues, states should "reach out with those com-
munities for a conception of basic human rights which is 'neutral with 
respect to the main political and economic divisions in the world' " (p. 
126). 
The problem with Dr. Vincent's thesis is that it is inadequate for 
locating, and, especially, solving the problems that give rise to the 
most serious human rights affronts. Dr. Vincent notes that the duty 
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imposed on developed countries by recognizing the right to life is, at a 
minimum, to avoid depriving others of their basic rights (which might 
involve reshaping the international economic order to eliminate its 
structural violence) or; at a maximum, to transfer resources to the 
Third World (p. 127). But while virtually all would agree that starva-
tion, for instance, is an affront to human dignity, the cause of the suf-
fering and the appropriate solution are not purely technical questions, 
as Dr. Vincent seems to believe. The author writes, "[t]he possibility 
of a technical solution to [the problem of starvation], not engaging the 
major ideologies in an argument about their superiority to the others 
. . . makes it score some points on the scale of practicability as an 
international policy" (pp. 147-48). Yet the proposed responses to re-
current food shortages are likely to be influenced sharply by one's 
political preferences. Thus, we do not escape from the problem of po-
litically expedient use of human rights discourse because the states 
that are likely to be judged illegitimate for failing to meet their citi-
zens' basic needs are the states that adopt policies of which we disap-
prove. For example, is the government of a famine-stricken country 
illegitimate simply because it has refused to implement land reform or 
has collectivized its agricultural system, in either case with disastrous 
consequences? 
Another shortcoming of Dr. Vincent's thesis occurs in the East-
West context where, because hunger is less pervasive, there is less 
agreement on what constitutes a human rights affront. It is also not 
clear that there is a genuine dialogue between the East and the West 
where each side seeks to persuade the other of its moral position. In 
the absence of such a dialogue, human rights claims are not reflective 
of a shared morality, but represent yet another interest to be factored 
into East-West politics. This criticism also applies, though with less 
force, to the North-South context. For human rights claims to go be-
yond interests, the participants must believe in the consensus they are 
forming. 
Dr. Vincent has provided a thought-provoking book about the role 
human rights ought to play in foreign policy. One can only hope that 
it will encourage the participants in the international human rights 
debate to argue in good faith. 
.:.._sandip Bhattachatji 
